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INTRODUCTION
What really happened during surgery? Does it have to be a mys-
tery? We don’t lack the means to videotape surgeries. Tools for audio-
visual recording have become both less expensive and more capable.
We don’t lack interest in recording surgeries. Families affected by sur-
gical mistakes have advocated for state laws that would require sur-
geries to be recorded upon request.1 We also don’t lack reasons. Both
patient safety programs and medical malpractice litigation spend con-
siderable energy reconstructing what happened during surgery. Per-
haps more problematic is that even when we can accurately
reconstruct what happened, we don’t always understand why it hap-
pened. Per Victor Hugo, maybe we don’t lack the strength; we lack
the will?2 If this is true, why? If pilots and athletes and stage perform-
ers pour over video to improve their performance, why don’t sur-
geons? Do the barriers originate in law, or in medicine, or in both?
* Callejo Endowed Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Research, Gerald J. Ford Research
Fellow, Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law. I thank Mackenzie Wortley for
characteristically excellent research and organization.
1. See, e.g., H. 633, 187th Gen. Court (Mass. 2011); Wis. State Assemb. 863, 2017–2018 Leg.
(Wis. 2017).
2. “People do not lack strength; they lack will.” Edward H. Eppens, Side-Lights on Themes
and Texts, 83 HOMILETIC REV. 78, 79 (1922) (quoting Victor Hugo).
239
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Physicians from the University of Toronto have developed what
they call the “O.R. Black Box” to record surgeries in great detail and
then detect errors using expert reviews and machine-learning algo-
rithms.3 The implications for both medicine and law may be profound.
This Article evaluates how existing law might treat data generated by
the O.R. Black Box and similar technologies, and it then contemplates
how to craft a more optimal “information policy” to accommodate
both patient safety and medical malpractice uses of such data. In
short, the O.R. Black Box seems like a good idea. Can the law accom-
modate it? And if not, what can be done?
I. A BLACK BOX IN THE O.R.
More accurate, sophisticated methods of identifying medical errors
like the O.R. Black Box are much needed. Each year, preventable
errors cause hundreds of thousands of deaths, millions of injuries, and
billions in lost income, lost household production, disability costs, and
additional health spending.4 The medical industry has long looked to
aviation for lessons in how to improve safety and minimize errors.5
Health providers today better understand the nature of both human-
and systems-based errors thanks to aviation. The widespread adoption
of aviation-style checklists during surgery is a frequently-celebrated
example.6
Aviation also teaches that the events that lead to “near-misses”
strongly resemble the events that lead to actual harm.7 Likewise,
blame-free error reporting in aviation has also inspired arguments for
a similar reporting system in medicine. The Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
3. Mitchell G. Goldenberg et al., Using Data to Enhance Performance and Improve Quality
and Safety in Surgery, 152 JAMA SURGERY 972 (2017).
4. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-06-09-
00090, ADVERSE EVENTS IN HOSPITALS: NATIONAL INCIDENCE AMONG MEDICARE BENEFI-
CIARIES, at i–ii (2010); INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN 26–27 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds.,
1999); Jill Van Den Bos et al., The $17.1 Billion Problem: The Annual Cost of Measurable Medi-
cal Errors, 30 HEALTH AFF. 596, 597 (2011); How Safe Is Your Hospital? Our New Ratings Find
That Some Are Riskier than Others, CONSUMER REP. (Aug. 2012), http://www.consumerreports
.org/cro/magazine/2012/08/how-safe-is-your-hospital/index.htm (“More than 2.25 million Ameri-
cans will probably die from medical harm this decade . . . like wiping out the entire populations
of North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Vermont.”).
5. See, e.g., Brian A. Liang & Steven D. Small, Communicating About Care: Addressing Fed-
eral-State Issues in Peer Review and Mediation to Promote Patient Safety, 3 HOUS. J. HEALTH L.
& POL’Y 219, 220 n.7 (2003).
6. See generally ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO: HOW TO GET THINGS RIGHT
(2010). See also Alex B. Haynes et al., A Surgical Safety Checklist to Reduce Morbidity and
Mortality in a Global Population, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 491 (2009).
7. HUMAN FACTORS IN AVIATION 97, 98 (Earl L. Wiener & David C. Nagel eds., 1988).
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tion (NASA) encourage reporting of errors and near-misses by using
anonymous, voluntary, and confidential reporting for pilots, mechan-
ics, air traffic controllers, and other aviation professionals.8 The gov-
ernment explains that it “has chosen to waive fines and penalties,
subject to certain limitations, for unintentional violations of federal
aviation statutes and regulations which are reported to [the Aviation
Safety Reporting System].”9 Some of these notions have bled into
medicine.
So, it makes sense that the logic of using a “black box” to record
flight data to better understand aviation errors would also make its
way into medicine. In 1965, Air Canada installed the first multi-chan-
nel, in-flight “black box” recorders on commercial aircraft.10 The idea
was to capture pilot audio and other flight data to understand the cir-
cumstances that preceded plane crashes.11 Inspired by black boxes in
aviation, Teodor Grantcharov and others at the University of Toronto
Department of Surgery developed the O.R. Black Box to record sur-
geries and detect errors.12 The O.R. Black Box gathers audio, visual,
and other digital data from multiple video cameras, microphones, and
other devices and sensors in the operating room during surgery.13
With these data, the system then uses expert reviews, machine-learn-
ing algorithms, and error-analysis software (a “perception engine”) to
create a timeline of the surgery.14 This system flags surgical events,
errors, and deviations from standard surgical techniques and proto-
cols.15 Trend analyses can further identify safety threats, error mecha-
nisms, event patterns, and surgical performance, which then can
inform targeted education, coaching, and other interventions to miti-
8. See Katharine Van Tassel, Using Clinical Practice Guidelines and Knowledge Translation
Theory to Cure the Negative Impact of the National Hospital Peer Review Hearing System on
Healthcare Quality, Cost, and Access, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 911, 969–70 (2013) [hereinafter Van Tas-
sel, Using Clinical Practice Guidelines and Knowledge Translation Theory].
9. Confidentiality and Incentives to Report, AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYS., http://asrs.arc
.nasa.gov/overview/confidentiality.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2018).
10. Facts About Air Canada, AIR CANADA, http://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/about/
media/facts-about-air-canada.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2018). The first recorder was developed
by Australian researcher David Warren in the wake of several unresolved crashes of the first jet-
powered airliner, the de Havilland Comet. Of course, the aviation community in Australia ini-
tially resisted its use. See Jason Paur, March 17, 1953: The Black Box is Born, WIRED (Mar. 17,
2010, 12:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2010/03/0317warren-invents-airplane-black-box/.
11. Paur, supra note 10.
12. Chethan Sathya, Surgical “Black Box” Could Reduce Errors, CNN (Aug. 22, 2014, 4:25
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/22/health/black-box-surgery/index.html.
13. Teodor Grantcharov, O.R. Black Box: Using Data to Improve Performance and Safety
(presentation on file with author).
14. Id.
15. Id.
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gate future errors.16 For example, the O.R. Black Box might associate
certain intraoperative events like thermal injuries or excessive bleed-
ing with certain intraoperative errors like inadequate visualization or
excessive force.17 The program might then further correlate these
problems with tool malfunction, distractions in the operating room, or
an error in technique.18 After identifying safety threats and their likely
causes, data from the O.R. Black Box can be used for surgical coach-
ing and building resilience in the surgical team.19
Grantcharov and Alexander Langerman stress the rationale behind
this technology:
Capturing OR activity via video is vastly beneficial. Recordings
enhance training, provide useful data for patients’ medical records,
and form the foundation to analyze OR performance and safety.
Technology and photography systems allow multiview, high-resolu-
tion images of patient anatomy, the surgical team, and all activities,
creating an omniscient record of a patient’s treatment.
These raw, unbiased accounts—both of room activity and the
procedure itself—will ostensibly be closer to “truth” than the post-
hoc recollections contained in surgical dictations, which frequently
lack important details missed or undocumented by the surgeon. Re-
cordings of the entire OR allow an objective evaluation of unrecog-
nized risks and hazards and provide more effective root cause
analysis and peer review after adverse events. . . .
We will be able to systematically assess new techniques and tech-
nologies, identify best practices among numerous individual prefer-
16. Id. The creators describe the O.R. Black Box as “a multiport synchronized data capture
and analytic platform.” Goldenberg et al., supra note 3, at 972. In more detail:
The OR Black Box continuously acquires various intraoperative data feeds, such as
audiovisual data, physiological parameters from both patients and health care profes-
sionals, and multiple other sensors and devices . . . . Video is captured using in-room
wide-angle cameras, and intracorporeal video is collected from the laparoscope or
robotic camera or from light-mounted or wearable cameras in open surgical proce-
dures. All inputs are synchronized, encrypted, and stored on a secure server for further
analysis. Expert analysis and software-based algorithms populate a procedural timeline
using relevant data drawn from these inputs. Data points include procedural steps, dis-
ruptive environmental and organizational factors, OR team technical and nontechnical
skills, surgeon physiological stress, and intraoperative errors, events, and rectification
processes.
Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Grantcharov, supra note 13. Coaching surgeons has been shown to be effective at enhanc-
ing surgical skill. See generally Esther M. Bonrath et al., Comprehensive Surgical Coaching En-
hances Surgical Skill in the Operating Room: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 262 ANNALS
SURGERY 205 (2015).
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ences, and provide evidence-based recommendations for process
improvements and surgical training.20
Other studies confirm the power of video. For example, a hospital in
Long Island, New York saw handwashing compliance rates jump from
6.5% to 81.6% after installing cameras to monitor practices.21 And at
Indiana University, a blinded review showed that videotaping colo-
noscopies increased mean inspection time by 49% and improved the
quality of the inspection by 31%.22
The O.R. Black Box is being tested on laparoscopic weight-loss sur-
gery, a high-volume, frequently-performed procedure that lends itself
to error analysis.23 The great promise is that concurrent and direct
observation will collect more objective, comprehensive, and granular
data about surgical performance than retrospective reviews of patient
records and incident reports.24 These retrospective reviews are subject
to recall bias and often fail to change behavior.25 Moreover, because
all the data from the O.R. Black Box are digitized and available in
non-structured formats, they are more amenable to analysis by ma-
chine-learning algorithms.26 As such, popular media have latched onto
the potential of these technologies to improve patient care and de-
crease health spending.27
The O.R. Black Box, in short, may dramatically improve both the
quantity and quality of information available about surgical errors and
performance. The technology may force us to recalibrate our ideas
about the first-order question of what information about medical care
is available, with obvious second-order questions regarding who can
access, use, and disclose it. The Institute of Medicine’s seminal report,
To Err Is Human, observed that a predicate to improving patient
safety is collecting more and better information about medical er-
rors.28 The O.R. Black Box may represent a large step toward meeting
this charge.
20. Alexander Langerman & Teodor Grantcharov, Are We Ready for Our Close-Up? Why
and How We Must Embrace Video in the OR, 266 ANNALS SURGERY 934, 934 (Dec. 2017).
21. Donna Armellino et al., Using High-Technology to Enforce Low-Technology Safety Mea-
sures: The Use of Third-Party Remote Video Auditing and Real-Time Feedback in Healthcare, 54
CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1, 5 (2012).
22. Douglas K. Rex et al., The Impact of Videorecording on the Quality of Colonoscopy Per-
formance: A Pilot Study, 105 AM. J. GASTROENTEROLOGY 2312, 2312 (2010).
23. Goldenberg et al., supra note 3, at 973.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 972.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Sathya, supra note 12; Erika Tucker, Airline-Inspired Black Box to Help Surgeons
Improve O.R. Performance, GLOBAL NEWS (July 8, 2014, 4:53 PM), https://globalnews.ca/news/
1439596/airline-inspired-black-box-to-help-surgeons-improve-o-r-performance/.
28. INST. OF MED., supra note 4, at 4.
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Unfortunately, the creators of the O.R. Black Box see uncertainty
about legal liability as a potential barrier to adoption in the United
States.29 Nonetheless, pilot use in select U.S. hospitals has begun, and
the system was being tested in six countries as of April 2018.30 Still,
there is significant uncertainty as to how U.S. law would treat data
generated by the O.R. Black Box or similar technologies.
II. THE PEER REVIEW PRIVILEGE
An obvious way to encourage hospitals to record surgeries would
be to protect recordings from discovery under state and federal laws
that grant evidentiary privileges to hospital peer reviews. In its most
basic formulation, hospital peer review is the process by which physi-
cians evaluate the professional competence of other physicians with
privileges at that facility.31 The process itself usually proceeds in two
or three phases: (1) an investigation phase that includes a review of
documents, records, and perhaps interviews; (2) a hearing phase that
allows the physician in question to participate; and sometimes (3) an
appellate phase that allows decisions to be appealed to a hospital
board of directors.32 Hospitals must operate a peer review system to
maintain accreditation by the Joint Commission and to participate in
Medicare.33 Moreover, it is not uncommon for states to require hospi-
tal peer review as a condition of licensure.34
Peer review is often justified based on several overlapping notions:
only physicians can properly evaluate other physicians; non-public re-
views are a necessary precondition to candid communication about
medical errors; and review by one’s peers will motivate physicians to
29. Goldenberg et al., supra note 3, at 973.
30. Discussion with Teodor Grantcharov (Apr. 17, 2018). The six countries include: Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United States. Id.
31. Michael D. Benson et al., Hospital Quality Improvement: Are Peer Review Immunity, Priv-
ilege, and Confidentiality in the Public Interest?, 11 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 2–3 (2016); Charles
R. Koepke, Physician Peer Review Immunity: Time to Euthanize a Fatally Flawed Policy, 22 J.L.
& HEALTH 1, 3 (2009) (“Simply defined, physician peer review is the process whereby doctors
evaluate the quality of their colleagues’ work product in order to assure that prevailing standards
of care are being met.”). Although most commonly performed at hospitals, the peer review privi-
lege often extends to non-hospital facilities that provide medical care, including ambulatory sur-
gical centers, nursing homes, and other licensed facilities. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§ 805(a)(1)(B)(i) (West 2017).
32. For more detail on the process, see Van Tassel, Using Clinical Practice Guidelines and
Knowledge Translation Theory, supra note 8, at 927–29; AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS’N, PEER
REVIEW GUIDEBOOK: CREDENTIALING AND PEER REVIEW PRACTICE GROUP OF THE AMERI-
CAN HEALTH LAWYERS ASSOCIATION (3d ed. 2003).
33. 42 C.F.R. § 482.22 (2018).
34. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.0315 (West 2017).
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provide higher quality care.35 As such, both state and federal law, to
varying degrees, privilege from discovery materials generated during
peer review.
A. State Statutory Privileges
Every state privileges the records and communications generated
for peer review actions, and most states also protect from discovery
other forms of internal evaluation, such as hospital morbidity and
mortality conferences, root cause analyses, and to a lesser extent, er-
ror reports—though states vary quite a bit on these later categories.36
First, most states provide some form of statutory immunity for par-
ticipants in hospital peer review committees.37 The idea behind statu-
tory immunity is to protect physicians that serve on peer review
committees from being sued under antitrust or unfair competition
laws by the physician whose performance had been reviewed.38
Second, the more robust state laws also privilege these materials
from civil discovery.39 Notable states with a peer review privilege in-
clude California,40 Illinois,41 New York,42 and Texas.43 Indeed, a 2016
review found that, “[e]xcept for New Jersey, every state and the Dis-
trict of Columbia have some form of privilege for the peer review pro-
cess . . . .”44 The obvious purpose is to prevent malpractice plaintiffs
from using documents and communications generated by hospital
peer review committees to prove that a physician was negligent.45
Third, as an additional layer of protection, “all but ten states protect
the confidentiality of peer review information”—meaning that outside
a judicial proceeding, peer review information may not be released to
35. Ilene N. Moore et al., Rethinking Peer Review: Detecting and Addressing Medical Malprac-
tice Claims Risk, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (2006).
36. Joanna C. Schwartz, A Dose of Reality for Medical Malpractice Reform, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1224, 1264 (2013).
37. Benson et al., supra note 31, at app. The exceptions being California, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, and Oregon. Id.
38. Eleanor D. Kinney, Hospital Peer Review of Physicians: Does Statutory Immunity Increase
Risk of Unwarranted Professional Injury?, 13 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 57, 63 (2009).
39. Benson et al., supra note 31, at 6, app.
40. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1157 (West 2018).
41. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-2101–2102 (2017).
42. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-m(2) (McKinney 2018).
43. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 160.006–160.007 (West 2017). In Texas, the peer review privi-
lege is expansive. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.032 (West 2017); Gail N. Friend et
al., The New Rules of Show and Tell: Identifying and Protecting the Peer Review and Medical
Committee Privileges, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 607 (1997).
44. Benson et al., supra note 31, at 6. See also id. at app.
45. Benson et al., supra note 31, at 6.
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third parties.46 Thus, in all but a few states, peer review documents
enjoy statutory immunity and are both confidential and non-
discoverable.
To consider just one prominent example, California’s Evidence
Code protects from discovery the records and proceedings of hospital
peer review committees.47 In some cases, courts have interpreted the
protection broadly, noting that the law “exacts a social cost because it
impairs malpractice plaintiffs’ access to evidence.”48 California’s Busi-
ness and Professions Code also requires peer review bodies to report
adverse actions such as the termination or restriction of staff privi-
leges to state agencies.49 However, these reports to state agencies do
not jeopardize their confidentiality vis-a`-vis other third parties.50
Of course, not all state privileges are coextensive, particularly as to
the scope of records protected. Some state privileges are narrow, cov-
ering only a peer review committee’s formal records and proceedings,
rather than, say, the incident reports and other germinal records that
may be produced by staff who observe mistakes in patient care.51 In
these narrow states, records cannot be strategically shielded from dis-
covery by being funneled through peer review committees. However,
some state privileges can be much broader, protecting incident reports
and other germinal communications made to peer review commit-
tees.52 Of course, information independently available outside the
peer review process is not privileged, including records maintained in
the regular course of business, such as a patient’s medical records.53
Would video recordings of surgeries be privileged from discovery
under state law? Would subsequent error analysis of the kind gener-
ated by the O.R. Black Box software be privileged? In narrow states,
one could imagine an argument by malpractice plaintiffs that the re-
cordings themselves, and perhaps also the software’s error analyses,
would be a germinal record created prior to and outside of the formal
peer review proceedings, thus making it discoverable. But in states
with more expansive privileges, one could imagine that such record-
46. Benson et al., supra note 31, at 6. See also id. at app.
47. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1157 (West 2018).
48. See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Martinez, 274 Cal. Rptr. 712, 716 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)
(quoting Matchett v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. Rptr. 317, 320 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974)).
49. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 805(b) (West 2017).
50. Id. § 805(g).
51. Melissa Chiang, Promoting Patient Safety: Creating a Workable Reporting System, 18
YALE J. ON REG. 383, 388 (2001).
52. A good example is Texas. See TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 160.007(a) (West 2017); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.032(a) (West 2017).
53. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.032(c).
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ings and software analyses would qualify for the privilege, if broadly
construed. Yet, even in states with broader privileges, one could argue
that the underlying recordings themselves—as opposed to the
software’s error analyses and findings—would be discoverable in the
same way that surgical notes would be discoverable, as creations ante-
cedent to the peer review process. It is thus possible that in narrow
states, the video recordings and the software analyses would be
treated separately.
However, even in narrow states, a hospital might be able to amend
its bylaws to form a special committee on surgical quality, for exam-
ple. The special committee would be established for the purpose of
recording surgeries and reducing errors—thus protecting both the un-
derlying video and the subsequent software analyses. In California, a
court applied the state’s peer review privilege to a hospital’s infection
control committee.54 The California court also noted that infection
control is mandated by California regulations, by hospital accreditors
like the Joint Commission, and by American Hospital Association
(AHA) guidelines.55 Still, there is the question of scope. Precisely
which information and records would be discoverable? As the Califor-
nia court observed:
Information developed or obtained by hospital administrators or
others which does not derive from an investigation into the quality
of care or the evaluation thereof by a medical staff committee, and
which does not disclose the investigative and evaluative activities of
such committee, is not rendered immune from discovery . . . merely
because it is later placed in the possession of a medical staff com-
mittee or made known to committee members; and this may be so
even if the information in question may be relevant in a general way
to the investigative and evaluative functions of the committee.56
The court continued that some information clearly falls within the re-
view committee’s privilege, including “self-generated analysis” of the
committee.57 Records gathered “as a matter of course” for committee
review might qualify for the privilege, at least in California.58 Still, the
California Supreme Court has held that records need not be “gener-
ated by the protected committee” to qualify for the privilege.59 Thus,
54. Santa Rosa Memorial Hosp. v. Leary, 220 Cal. Rptr. 236, 239–40 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
55. Id. at 246 (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 70739 (2018); JOINT COMM’N ACCREDITATION
HOSPS., MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS (1985); and AM. HOSP. ASS’N., INFECTION CONTROL IN THE
HOSPITAL (4th ed. 1979)).
56. Id. at 245.
57. Id. at 247.
58. Id. at 249.
59. Alexander v. Superior Court, 859 P.2d 96, 100 (Cal. 1993) (citing Hinson v. Clairemont
Cmty. Hosp., 267 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)). Additionally, the court observed that the
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it seems that the video recordings generated by the O.R. Black Box
and similar programs might be discoverable in certain states, depend-
ing on how expansively courts construe their statutory privileges.
B. The Federal Privilege
Although most of the relevant law here is state law, two federal
laws are also worth considering. First, the Health Care Quality Im-
provement Act of 1986 (HCQIA) protects both hospitals and mem-
bers of their peer review committees from liability when conducting
peer review activities, referred to in the statute as “professional re-
view actions.”60 The Act precludes both state and federal causes of
action, such as an antitrust claim under federal law.61 However, unlike
state laws, the HCQIA does not privilege peer review documents
from civil discovery.62 It insulates participants from liability without
creating an evidentiary privilege.
An interesting question is whether a system like the O.R. Black Box
would qualify as a “professional review action” under the HCQIA. To
qualify, the Act requires that a review action must be taken:
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in the furtherance of
quality health care,
(2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter,
(3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are afforded to
the physician involved or after such other procedures as are fair to
the physician under the circumstances, and
(4) in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted by the
facts known after such reasonable effort to obtain facts and meeting
the requirement of paragraph (3).63
The Act seems to contemplate retrospective review, not concurrent or
prospective monitoring like the O.R. Black Box provides—though
that could be a matter of semantics. However, a surgeon agreeing be-
forehand to have a procedure recorded and analyzed by the O.R.
Black Box may be said to have waived any arguments under para-
graph (3) that there was inadequate notice or process.
As an important aside, the HCQIA also established the National
Practitioner Databank (NPDB) to serve as a clearinghouse for “pro-
Florida Supreme Court had reached the same interpretation of a similarly-worded statute in
Cruger v. Love, 599 So.2d 111, 114 (Fla. 1992). Id.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)(1) (2012).
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Teasdale v. Marin General Hosp., 138 F.R.D. 6691 (N.D. Cal. 1991); LeMasters v.
Christ Hosp., 791 F. Supp. 188 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) (2012).
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fessional review actions” taken against practitioners.64 Of course, the
NPDB has received significant attention for its shortcomings. In-
tended to be a nationwide database of physicians with a record of mal-
practice or loss of clinical privileges, instead the Databank is easily
bypassed and thus woefully incomplete. For example, a 2009 report by
Public Citizen found that the Databank is missing thousands of inci-
dents that should be reported each year.65 Public Citizen estimated
that anywhere from 5,000 to 10,000 adverse actions by hospitals would
be reportable to the NPDB each year, but an average of only 650 were
reported yearly between 1990 and 2007.66 Indeed, by the end of 2007,
a staggering 49% of hospitals registered with the NPDB “had never
reported a clinical privilege sanction to the NPDB.”67 Thus, the
NPDB is viewed by many as a failed experiment in disclosure-based
regulation.68
The second important federal law here is the Patient Safety and
Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (PSQIA).69 Congress passed the
Act largely in response to the Institute of Medicine’s seminal report,
To Err Is Human, which found that medical errors are responsible for
up to 98,000 deaths annually—roughly 270 per day.70 The PSQIA
privileges from discovery any records generated by health care provid-
ers that qualify as “patient safety work product” and are submitted to
external “patient safety organizations” (PSOs) such as the Joint Com-
mission.71 The Act defines “patient safety work product” as “data, re-
ports, records, memoranda, analyses . . . and written or oral
statements” generated by a health care provider for reporting to a
64. The HCQIA does not refer to the National Practitioner Databank by name, though it
requires reports. 42 U.S.C. § 11131 (2012). The name derives from the regulations implementing
the Act. 45 C.F.R. §§ 60.1–60.22 (2018).
65. Alan Levine & Sidney Wolfe, Hospitals Drop the Ball on Physician Oversight: Failure of
Hospitals to Discipline and Report Doctors Endangers Patients, PUB. CITIZEN 5 (May 27, 2009),
https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/18731.pdf.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 5–9.
68. Benson et al., supra note 31, at 14–15. For critiques of disclosure-based regulation, see
generally ARCHON FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANS-
PARENCY (2007); Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011); Nathan Cortez, Regulation by Database, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 1
(2018).
69. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-41, 119 Stat. 424
(codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 299b-21–299b-26 (2012)).
70. INST. OF MED., supra note 4, at 26, 31. For a critique of this estimate, see, for example,
Clement J. McDonald et al., Deaths Due to Medical Errors Are Exaggerated in Institute of
Medicine Report, 284 JAMA 93 (2000).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-22 (2012). The Patient Safety Rule promulgated by the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) spells out these requirements in greater detail. 42
C.F.R. §§ 3.10–3.552 (2018).
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PSO.72 This does not include patient medical records or other records
maintained separately from a patient safety evaluation system.73
To qualify as a PSO, an organization must: (1) be certified by the
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), which re-
quires the improvement of patient safety to be the entity’s raison
d’eˆtre and the focus of its primary activities; (2) employ qualified staff
(including medical professionals); and (3) not be a health insurer or
part of one.74 The role of a PSO is to gather provider records (“patient
safety work product”), evaluate them, and make recommendations in
the form of revised protocols, best practices, and other corrections
that can minimize risks to patients.75 The statute requires PSOs, “to
the extent practicable,” to collect anonymized records in a “standard-
ized manner that permits valid comparisons of similar cases among
similar providers” and then to report that standardized data to
AHRQ.76 With nonidentifiable versions of these data77 and the idea
of creating a non-punitive, evidence-based system for providers and
PSOs to improve quality care,78 AHRQ maintains databases showing
patient safety incidents, near misses, or unsafe conditions.79
To fit materials generated by the O.R. Black Box into this privilege,
a hospital obviously would have to send the materials to an AHRQ-
certified PSO. Thus, as with state law, it is easy to see ways that the
O.R. Black Box and its findings would qualify for the federal
privilege.
C. Critiques
The peer review privilege is not immune from criticism. In 2009,
Public Citizen published a scathing report on peer review, finding in-
effective investigations, widespread under-reporting to the NPDB,
and routine failure to take disciplinary actions.80 Immunity is accused
of being both too lenient and too strict in some cases, depending on
whether the committee makes a Type 1 error (i.e., a false positive find-
ing of substandard care) or a Type 2 error (i.e., a false negative finding
72. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7) (2012).
73. Id.
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 299b-24(b)(1), 299b-24(d) (2012).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(5).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-24(b)(1)(F).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-23 (2012).
78. Id. § 299b-23(a).
79. Common Formats, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, https://www.pso.ahrq
.gov/common (last visited Mar. 21, 2018).
80. Levine & Wolfe, supra note 65.
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of competent care).81 The quality of the evidence and scientific valid-
ity of data used by peer review committees are frequently criticized.82
Critics also point to instances in which hospitals have used sham or
bad faith peer review—or merely the threat of it—as a weapon to
retaliate against doctors that raised concerns about the quality of care
at the facility,83 or as a way to undermine fellow competitors.84 Critics
also argue that errors and abuses in the peer review process actually
undermine quality control and thus, paradoxically, undermine a key
rationale for peer review.85 For example, a retrospective analysis of
physician reviews using a Medicare database showed significant disa-
greement among reviewers in what constituted “quality” care, finding
that reviewers “judged care much more harshly among cases with seri-
ous adverse outcomes although the care was identical in each matched
case.”86 Given the inaccuracies and abuses of peer review, some physi-
cians argue that immunity should be eliminated.87
None of this necessarily undermines systems like the O.R. Black
Box, however. Video recordings and software-based error analyses
should provide more objective data to peer review committees, which
might blunt many of the above criticisms.
III. IS SURGICAL VIDEO DISCOVERABLE AND ADMISSIBLE?
If not privileged by statute, would surgical video be discoverable or
otherwise admissible under common law? Caselaw evaluating the is-
sue in any depth is surprisingly sparse. Cases show that some surgeries
are videotaped, and these tapes sometimes are given to patients or
their families in the wake of errors.88 Video can be useful in explain-
81. Benson et al., supra note 31, at 2.
82. See, e.g., Katherine Van Tassel, Hospital Peer Review Standards and Due Process: Moving
from Tort Doctrine to Contract Principles Based on Clinical Practice Guidelines, 36 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1179 (2006); Van Tassel, Using Clinical Practice Guidelines and Knowledge Translation
Theory, supra note 8.
83. Benson et al., supra note 31, at 9 (citing Steve Twedt, The Cost of Courage: How the
Tables Turn on Doctors, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Oct. 26, 2003, 3:00 AM), http://www.post-
gazette.com/news/nation/2003/10/26/The-Cost-of-Courage-How-the-tables-turn-on-doctors/stor
ies/200310260052).
84. See generally Koepke, supra note 31.
85. Benson et al., supra note 31, at 8.
86. Saul N. Weingart et al., Physician-Reviewers’ Perceptions and Judgments About Quality of
Care, 5 INT’L J. QUALITY HEALTH CARE 357, 357 (2001) (emphasis added).
87. Benson et al., supra note 31, at 1; Koepke, supra note 31. Of course, other physicians
defend it, even while acknowledging its shortcomings. See, e.g., Moore et al., supra note 35.
88. See, e.g., Giles v. Brookwood Health Servs., Inc., 5 So.3d 533, 540–41 (Ala. 2008) (oopho-
rectomy videotaped and recording given to patient in wake of wrong-site surgery, removing right
ovary instead of left ovary); Morgan v. Abay, 850 P.2d 840, 842 (Kan. 1993) (noting that portions
of a brain surgery were videotaped, but not whether the recording was given to plaintiffs); Ben-
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ing complex surgical procedures to juries,89 even when the video
shows surgery on a different patient.90 In at least some cases, the sur-
gery was recorded for teaching purposes rather than for purposes of
quality control.91 In one of these cases, the court held that a video
recording was not discoverable because it was not part of the patient’s
medical record.92 The court reasoned that the video was not required
to be made by the hospital or the surgeon, was created purely to edu-
cate other surgeons, and “was not made in any respect for the care or
treatment of the patient.”93 However, the court also noted that the
tape could be discoverable if the plaintiff later stated a cause of action,
instead of seeking the tape for the purpose of establishing one in the
first instance.94
Of course, when video is introduced by plaintiffs to show negli-
gence, defendants often argue that it is inadmissible.95 For example, in
a product liability case involving breast implants, the trial court ex-
cluded video of the surgery to remove the plaintiff’s implants after
counsel for the manufacturer argued that it was offensive and “diffi-
cult to watch.”96 Instead, the court admitted still photos of the surgery
and testimony regarding whether the surgeon had cut the implant dur-
fer v. Sachs, 797 N.Y.S.2d 592 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (defendant orthopedic surgeon had re-
corded spine surgery and had provided copy of tape to plaintiff before trial). Of course, patients
are not always successful at accessing videotapes during pretrial discovery. See, e.g., Hill v.
Springer, 506 N.Y.S.2d 255 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (holding that plaintiff was not entitled to video-
tape of surgery to determine whether he had a cause of action, as opposed to after a malpractice
action has commenced).
89. See, e.g., Benfer, 797 N.Y.S.2d at 592.
90. See, e.g., Glusaskas v. Hutchinson, 544 N.Y.S.2d 323, 324 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). In
Glusaskas, the trial court admitted into evidence video of a defendant surgeon performing a
similar heart valve replacement surgery on another patient six years after the surgery at question
because it “was sufficiently relevant to show the jury how the procedure is done and . . . was not
prejudicial.” Id. However, the video “was prepared exclusively for the trial of the instant action
some two or three weeks prior thereto and more time was spent on the videotaped surgery than
is the normal practice.” Id. Moreover, the patient in the video was male rather than female, was
a different age, and his physical condition and valve were markedly different from the plaintiff.
Id. The appellate court agreed with plaintiffs that the videotape was “highly improper, inflam-
matory, and prejudicial.” Id.
91. Traver v. Packaging Indus. Grp., Inc., 577 A.2d 876, 876–77 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1990) (explaining that a surgery was recorded because, “[c]oincidentally, the Bellevue Hospital
microsurgery team was cooperating with a medical publishing company which was preparing a
videotape for teaching purposes.”).
92. Id. at 876–77.
93. Hill, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
94. Id. at 257.
95. See, e.g., In re: Diet D (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Products Liability
Litigation, No. MDL 1203, 2001 WL 454586 at *24 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2001) (denying defendant’s
motion to exclude a videotape of surgery performed by an expert witness on a patient who later
became a plaintiff).
96. Bean v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. 965 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998).
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ing the procedure, causing it to leak silicone.97 Although  the appellate
court held that the trial court did indeed err in excluding the video-
tape, it found the error to be harmless and thus, not an abuse of dis-
cretion.98 The appellate court held that the tape was cumulative of
other evidence99 and found that the whole case did not turn on the
excluded evidence.100
But videos are not always excluded from evidence. For example,
video of surgery to repair a gruesome hand injury was admitted in a
product liability suit (rather than a malpractice suit) despite the court
acknowledging that “the videotape is a graphic display in color of a
very unpleasant event.”101 The appellate court held that the tape was
not inherently inflammatory and that its probative value in demon-
strating the severity of the injury substantially outweighed the risk of
undue prejudice, quoting a Chinese proverb that “[o]ne picture is
worth more than ten thousand words.”102
In some cases, defendants introduce video as evidence to show that
physicians met the standard of care.103 For example, in one case in-
volving a brain surgery that resulted in a stroke and another brain
injury, both plaintiffs and defendants offered as evidence videotape of
the surgery, without objection.104 During the trial, plaintiffs played
video clips during their experts’ testimony to show that cerebral artery
clamps had remained in place for a certain amount of time.105 Al-
though defendants also played select clips during their expert’s testi-
mony, defendants played the entire forty-minute video during closing
arguments, drawing objections from the plaintiffs that doing so placed
matters not in evidence before the jury and was intended to inflame
and mislead the jury.106 The trial court overruled the plaintiffs’ objec-
tion but warned defendants that they risked distracting the jury.107 Af-
ter trial, the court denied plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial, which was
97. Id. at 658–60.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 659–60. The court’s finding that the evidence was cumulative was largely due to
plaintiff’s technical failure to reoffer the tape as evidence on a different point. Id.
100. Id. at 660.
101. Traver v. Packaging Indus. Grp., 577 A.2d 876, 877 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1990).
102. Id. at 877–78.
103. Powderly v. S. Cty. Anesthesia Assoc., 245 S.W.3d 267, 271–72 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (de-
fendants played entire videotape of 40-minute brain surgery during closing argument; but both
parties had offered the tape into evidence).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 271.
106. Id. at 271–72.
107. Id. at 272.
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upheld on appeal.108 On appeal, the court found that allowing defend-
ants to play the entire video during closing arguments was not an
abuse of the trial court’s discretion because both parties had, after all,
introduced the video in its entirety, without stipulation.109
Of course, video evidence does not always convey objective truth.
Sometimes juries see video of the wrong patient or the wrong proce-
dure by mistake.110 And in at least one instance, plaintiffs found that
the recordings had been edited or key sequences deleted, raising the
possibility of spoliation.111
Thus, whether video from the O.R. Black Box or similar systems is
discoverable and admissible is highly uncertain, and inevitably will de-
pend on facts and judicial precedents somewhat unique to each case.
Moreover, most states have a rule, similar to Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 403, that gives trial court judges the discretion to balance the
probative value of evidence against its likely prejudicial effect on the
jury,112 making the outcome in each case even more difficult to
predict.
IV. A NEW INFORMATION POLICY?
The O.R. Black Box and similar technologies obviously seem worth
pursuing. But we may need a new information policy to accommodate
them. Surgical videos and sophisticated software error analyses should
increase both the quantity and, hopefully, the quality of information
about surgical performance. But the law should accommodate both
the obvious patient interest in accessing recordings of their own sur-
geries, as well as the obvious interest of hospitals and surgeons to use
such recordings for quality improvement without generating undue li-
ability. And therein lies the traditional tension between an informa-
tion policy tailored to medical malpractice and an information policy
tailored to patient safety. As Bill Sage and colleagues observed in
2006:
108. Id.
109. Powderly, 245 S.W.3d at 272–73.
110. Benfer v. Sachs, 797 N.Y.S.2d 592, 593 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (plaintiff offered as evi-
dence video of a spine surgery provided by the defendant surgeon but noted that the identifying
numbers on the implanted devices in the video differed from the identifying numbers of the
devices implanted in the plaintiff).
111. Giles v. Brookwood Health Servs., Inc., 5 So.3d 533, 541 (Ala. 2008) (“[I]n viewing the
tape of two to three minutes of video and after that there appears to be twenty to thirty minutes
edited or erased and then a thirty (30) to forty-five (45) second closing. The tape appears to have
been changed.”). Although the plaintiff argued that defendants engaged in spoliation of evi-
dence, her claims were not timely and thus were dismissed on summary judgment. Id. at 554–55.
112. See, e.g., Bean v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 965 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998)
(applying Texas Rule of Evidence 403, which parallels Federal Rule of Evidence 403).
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[T]he law’s traditional focus on individual physician responsibility is
at odds with emerging theories of systems-based quality improve-
ment predicated on voluntary, confidential self-reporting. On this
account, both malpractice liability and public disclosure create a
“culture of blame” that arguably retards organizational improve-
ment by inducing physicians to withhold and conceal information
about medical errors. Thus it seems that two important uses for in-
formation about medical error—accountability and improvement—
pull in opposite directions.113
More recently, however, scholars have begun to recognize the cru-
cial role that malpractice litigation plays in producing information
about medical errors that would otherwise not come to light.114 We
have also come to recognize that perhaps the pendulum has swung too
far in blaming systems rather than individual performance for medical
errors.115 Thus, the time is ripe to rethink traditional information pol-
icy and move towards a new de´tente between malpractice and patient
safety.
But what should an “information policy” for surgical recordings and
software analyses look like? Debates about an optimal information
policy for malpractice and patient safety often boil down to who has
access to information about medical errors, with obvious secondary
implications regarding the “accuracy, fairness, and effectiveness” of
the data.116 In other words, who can access what information, and how
is the information processed and presented? The answers to these
questions can be sharply contested, given the different audiences for
this data—patients, physicians, hospitals, health insurers, plaintiffs’
lawyers, malpractice insurers, and other ancillary parties like policy-
makers, regulators, investors, academic researchers, and professional
and trade associations.117
Can all these interests be accommodated? Perhaps not, given the
different goals of information policy in this area—both relational (i.e.,
as in private law disputes between patients and their providers) and
regulatory (i.e., involving broader public law questions over how to
improve health system performance).118 Relational and regulatory
goals can pull in opposite directions. As a result, scholars can argue at
113. William M. Sage et al., Bridging the Relational-Regulatory Gap: A Pragmatic Information
Policy for Patient Safety and Medical Malpractice, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1263, 1271 (2006).
114. See, e.g., David M. Studdert & Michelle M. Mello, In from the Cold? Law’s Evolving
Role in Patient Safety, 68 DEPAUL L. REV. 421 (2019).
115. Id.; David A. Hyman, Bad Doctors: Naming and Blaming in a World with Much Less
Claiming, 68 DEPAUL L. REV. 263 (2019).
116. Sage et al., supra note 113, at 1265.
117. Id. at 1280–83.
118. Id.
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once both that mandatory malpractice reporting to the NPDB should
be repealed, but that confidential settlements in malpractice cases
should also be prohibited—two notions that would seem to be incom-
patible.119 In essence, the trick is deciding what information should be
produced, how it should be presented, and who can access it.
The answers to these questions probably reside as much in medicine
as in law. Again, I discuss the legal barriers to effective use of surgical
video in Parts II and III, above. But the barriers in medicine are just
as significant. The prospect of recording clinical encounters can un-
nerve physicians.120 Indeed, in a handful of states where legislators
have introduced bills that would allow or even require surgeries to be
videotaped, opposition has come primarily from providers.121 Moreo-
ver, professional medical societies do not contemplate video record-
ings much in their official policies, and when they do, their focus is not
patient safety or liability. For example, the American Medical Associ-
ation (AMA) discusses videotaping patient care in a Code of Medical
Ethics opinion, but only in terms of privacy and confidentiality.122 The
preamble states: “Filming cannot benefit a patient medically and may
cause harm.”123
Yet, the notion that surgeries should be videotaped to improve
quality care is not new. A 1978 law review article observed that it had
become customary, by that time, to record surgeries for teaching and
quality control purposes:
Videotape in the surgical suite would hardly be an innovation.
Videotape cameras and recorders are currently in use in most teach-
ing hospitals, as well as several local hospitals, to measure the qual-
ity of medical care rendered by the hospital and its staff, and for use
as teaching material for professional personnel.124
119. Id. at 1264.
120. Glyn Elwyn et al., Can Patients Make Recordings of Medical Encounters? What Does the
Law Say?, 318 JAMA 513, 513 (2017).
121. Michael C. Ksiazek, Are Recorded Surgeries the Future of Medical Malpractice Investiga-
tion and Medical Error Prevention?, NAT’L L. REV. (July 29, 2015), https://www.natlawreview
.com/article/are-recorded-surgeries-future-medical-malpractice-investigation-and-medical-error-
pr.
122. Audio or Video Recording of Patients for Public Education, AMA, https://www.ama-assn
.org/delivering-care/audio-or-visual-recording-patients-public-education (last visited Oct. 15,
2018).
123. Id.
124. J. Douglas Peters & Bernard J. Wilkes, III, Videotaping of Surgery for Use as Demonstra-
tive Evidence in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 16 DUQUESNE L. REV. 358, 361 (1977–78). Pe-
ters and Wilkes note that the first judicial approval of videotape evidence was in 1969. Id. at 364
(citing Paramore v. State, 229 So.2d 855 (Fla. 1969)). That same year, an article in Surgery advo-
cated for videotaping surgery. Leonard F. Peltier et al., Television Videotape Recording: An Ad-
junct in Teaching Emergency Medical Care, 66 SURGERY 233 (1969).
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But video recordings, particularly outside of teaching hospitals, are
not as routine as one might think in modern medicine. As a result,
many are pushing to regularize video recordings. A 2013 Journal of
the American Medical Association (JAMA) article argued that vide-
otaping procedures can improve quality of care in a number of ways,
including providing unbiased evidence for both morbidity and mortal-
ity (M and M) conferences and peer review actions.125 The JAMA
article argued that making “procedure videos” part of patients’ medi-
cal records should become as normal as making computed tomogra-
phy (CT) or magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) images part of their
records.126 Furthering the analogy, the article notes that “past predic-
tions of a malpractice lawsuit avalanche when CT and [MRI] scan
images were about to become available to patients proved not to be
true.”127 Perhaps the experience with videos would be the same?
Nevertheless, medical culture has not fully embraced videotaped
patient encounters, despite the growing ubiquity of mobile recording
devices. Patients increasingly ask doctors if they can record their of-
fice visits—primarily as a more efficient, accurate way to take
notes128—but such requests can still unnerve doctors.129 As Glyn El-
wyn and colleagues have found, “many clinicians and clinics have con-
cerns about the ownership of recordings and the potential for these to
be used as a basis for legal claims or complaints.”130 Fear of liability
persists.
Given ongoing reluctance in the medical community, some states
have introduced legislation that would allow patients to videotape
their surgeries or even require such recordings.131 For example, a Wis-
consin bill would require hospitals, surgery centers, and the like to
offer to videotape the procedure for patients undergoing any surgery
that requires general anesthesia.132 The recording would be made part
125. Martin A. Makary, The Power of Video Recording: Taking Quality to the Next Level, 309
JAMA 1591 (2013).
126. Id. at 1592.
127. Id.
128. Elwyn et al., supra note 120, at 513–14; Glyn Elwyn, “Patientgate”—Digital Recordings
Change Everything, 348 BRIT. MED. J. g2078 (2014) [hereinafter Elwyn, “Patientgate”].
129. See, e.g., Elwyn et al., supra note 120, at 513; Michelle Rodriguez et al., Ethical Implica-
tions of Patients and Families Secretly Recording Conversations with Physicians, 313 JAMA 1615
(2015); Tim Lahey & Glyn Elwyn, Go Ahead and Hit ‘Record’ in the Doctor’s Office, STAT (July
10, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/07/10/record-doctors-office-patient-visit/.
130. Elwyn et al., supra note 120, at 513; Elwyn, “Patientgate”, supra note 128.
131. Ksiazek, supra note 121.
132. Julie’s Law, Wis. State Assemb. 863, 2017–2018 Leg. (Wis. 2017). The bill was named for
a thirty-eight-year-old patient given a fatal dose of propofol during surgery. Ksiazek, supra note
121. Both the Wisconsin Hospital Association and Wisconsin Medical Society oppose the bill. Id.
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of the patient’s medical record, and although disclosure to third par-
ties would be limited, there would be an exception for disclosure to an
attorney “for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.”133 Likewise, in
2011 the Massachusetts General Assembly considered a bill that
would provide for recorded surgeries.134
Two proposed bills do not a trend make. But perhaps given modern
capabilities, surgeries should be recorded and should be made part of
patients’ medical records. As Stephen Landsman observes, “the medi-
cal world’s silence about its mistakes may be the product of forces and
views within medicine, rather than a response to intrusions of the legal
system.”135 But if resistance resides primarily in medicine rather than
law, perhaps clarifying the legal implications would ease medicine’s
concerns.
Again, despite conventional wisdom, a culture of patient safety that
depends on being open and honest is not necessarily antithetical to a
culture of malpractice litigation in which provider instincts are to
“deny and defend.”136 Studies show that the threat of malpractice lia-
bility does not necessarily deter error reporting or quality improve-
ment efforts.137 In fact, malpractice litigation continues to be an
important source of data about failures in medical care138 and can in-
centivize higher quality care.139 Joanna Schwartz has examined the
real-world dynamics here, conducting a nationwide survey of health
care professionals and more in-depth discussions with thirty-five peo-
ple responsible for risk management and patient safety in hospitals.140
Her research made two key findings that rebut the conventional wis-
dom that malpractice liability is incompatible with patient safety.141
First, the surveys and interviews reveal that “malpractice liability does
133. Id.
134. H.633, 187th Gen. Court (Mass. 2011).
135. Stephan Landsman, Reflections on Juryphobia and Medical Malpractice Reform, 57
DEPAUL L. REV. 221, 232 (2008).
136. Schwartz, supra note 36, at 1227.
137. David A. Hyman & Charles M. Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the U.S.:
Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 893
(2005); TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 97 (2005).
138. Tom Baker & Timothy D. Lytton, Allowing Patients to Waive the Right to Sue for Medical
Malpractice: A Response to Thaler and Sunstein, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 233, 242 (2010); Barry R.
Furrow, The Patient Injury Epidemic: Medical Malpractice Litigation as a Curative Tool, 4
DREXEL L. REV. 41, 67 (2011); Margo Schlanger, Operationalizing Deterrence: Claims Manage-
ment (in Hospitals, a Large Retailer, and Jails and Prisons), 2 J. TORT L., 2008, at 31–32.
139. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 137, at 107; David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical
Malpractice Litigation and Tort Reform: It’s the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085
(2006).
140. Schwartz, supra note 36, at 1246–51.
141. Id. at 1230.
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not necessarily inhibit the kind of openness and transparency needed
to identify and address the root causes of medical errors.”142 Second,
they revealed that malpractice claims produce important information
about medical errors not necessarily captured by patient safety ef-
forts.143 Overall, Schwartz concludes that “malpractice litigation is not
incompatible with a culture of patient safety and, moreover, can play a
productive role in efforts to reduce medical error.”144
Given these findings, a modernized information policy should en-
courage or even require more transparency and self-disclosure. As
Katherine Van Tassel has argued, in the absence of reckless or inten-
tional conduct, physicians should be encouraged to self-report errors:
Just as in the case of the airline pilot who has committed an error
who is not punished if that pilot has self-reported, if the physician
. . . [has] reported to the anonymous third party reporting system,
any sanction should be limited to error avoidance training, and this
sanction should not be reported to the NPDB.145
Different benefits flow from openness and voluntary reporting. First,
both the number of lawsuits and overall legal costs actually can fall
when hospitals voluntarily disclose errors to patients. A study of the
University of Michigan Health System’s effort to voluntarily disclose
errors and offer compensation to patients showed a subsequent de-
crease in claims, lawsuits, and total liability costs to the hospital sys-
tem.146 Of course, Michigan’s experience might not translate perfectly
to other hospitals that do not have a closed staff model whose practi-
tioners are covered by a captive insurance company that “often as-
sumes legal responsibility.”147 Still, over the last decade or so,
“physicians, hospitals, regulators, and accreditation agencies coalesced
around the idea that disclosure was a professional imperative.”148 Not
surprisingly, many liability insurers have embraced affirmative disclo-
sure programs, and those that still retreat to the “deny and defend”
posture are regarded in the liability insurance industry as “dino-
saurs.”149 Voluntary disclosure of video captured by systems like the
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1230–31.
144. Id. at 1231.
145. Van Tassel, Using Clinical Practice Guidelines and Knowledge Translation Theory, supra
note 8, at 972. Van Tassel, of course, nods to Bob Wachter’s work here. See, e.g., ROBERT W.
WACHTER, UNDERSTANDING PATIENT SAFETY 349–53 (2d ed. 2012).
146. Allen Kachalia et al., Liability Claims and Costs Before and After Implementation of a
Medical Error Disclosure Program, 153 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 213, 217 (2010).
147. Id. at 213.
148. Studdert & Mello, supra note 114, at ___ (citing Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Disclosing
Harmful Medical Errors to Patients, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2713 (2007)).
149. Id. at ___.
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O.R. Black Box—but perhaps not disclosure of the software analy-
ses—would seem to be consistent with the movement here.
Second, systems like the O.R. Black Box could even inspire more
openness and transparency in the hospital peer review process as well.
Some argue that the peer review system would suffer fewer Type 1
and Type 2 errors150 if it were more transparent.151 With more objec-
tive, verifiable data available, there might be less concern that subjec-
tivity will taint the findings. Perhaps a compromise would be to make
error data publicly available at the facility level but not at the individ-
ual level, given obvious sensitivities regarding physician reputation.152
Or, perhaps disclosure of data generated by the O.R. Black Box could
be given to independent, external, third-party reviewers, which some
believe should replace internal reviews anyway.153 A final thought is
that if the information generated by systems like the O.R. Black Box
is a public good, then perhaps the government should even subsidize
its production and publication.154
In summary, prevailing ideas about an optimal “information policy”
that can accommodate both malpractice and patient safety goals will
need to evolve to account for new technologies like the O.R. Black
Box. These technologies may dramatically increase both the quantity
and quality of data about surgical performance. This Article is but a
modest step in that direction.
CONCLUSION
Technologies like the O.R. Black Box promise to dramatically in-
crease the quantity and quality of information we have about surgical
performance. As such, they may require that we recalibrate informa-
tion policies oriented towards older, less complete types of informa-
tion. Contemporary thought recognizes that the goals of an
information policy tailored to medical malpractice are not necessarily
incompatible with the goals of an information policy tailored to pa-
tient safety.
Perhaps the compromise here is to include the video recordings of
surgery as part of patient records, while protecting the data analyses
generated for quality improvement purposes under peer review privi-
150. For a description of Type 1 and Type 2 errors, see supra text accompanying note 81.
151. See, e.g., Benson et al., supra note 31, at 15–19; Koepke, supra note 31, at 1; Susan O.
Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost But No Benefit – Is It Time for a Change?, 25
AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (1999).
152. Sage et al., supra note 113, at 1307.
153. See, e.g., Benson et al., supra note 31, at 17–18.
154. Sage et al., supra note 113, at 1308.
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leges. Thus, objective data is made available to patients, while the sub-
jective evaluation is not made available and is reserved for peer
review. Giving patients access to raw video of their own surgeries and
making it a routine part of their medical records would also help
demystify medicine and show a basic respect for patient autonomy.155
One caution is that patient access to video without the accompanying
trend analyses and other normative evaluations could raise tricky
questions about what range of surgical techniques is “normal,” what
reasonable variance should be expected, and what variance from stan-
dard techniques should constitute malpractice.156 Moreover, it is hard
to know beforehand how often minor, relatively inconsequential er-
rors do and should occur.157 The non-initiated public probably has
“unrealistic expectations for perfection” in surgeons.158
Even though disclosure of video recordings is burdened with some
unanswered questions, the merits clearly seem to outweigh the costs.
In the 1960s, when flight data recording was first proposed, pilots re-
sisted.159 Their concerns over “the threat to their privacy and the risk
of retribution for mistakes led to legitimate demands for carefully de-
lineated uses of, and protections for, cockpit voice recorder data
before cockpit voice recorders were introduced in airplanes.”160 This
Article proposes careful delineations and protections for data gener-
ated by technologies like the O.R. Black Box.
155. Langerman & Grantcharov, supra note 20, at 934.
156. Id. at 935.
157. Id.
158. Goldenberg et al., supra note 3, at 973.
159. Langerman & Grantcharov, supra note 20, at 935.
160. Id. at 935.
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